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1. Introduction 
The question of the economic consequences of migration for the residents of poorer countries 
has received considerable recent attention.i  Yet, there are at least two reasons why restricting 
discussion of the desirability of migration to economic consequences would be 
unsatisfactory.  First, the voluminous empirical literature on brain-drain and remittances is 
ambiguous with respect to the costs and benefits of migration for those migrants leave behind 
in their countries of origin.  As has been widely noted, and despite work that shows their 
benefits for poverty alleviation, the jury is still out as to whether immigrant remittances either 
cancel out or at least counterbalance the economic costs of brain-drain (Brock and Blake 
2015: 43, 159; Brock 2016: 180; Blake: 2016a; Oberman 2016b: 106-7).   
 Importantly for present purposes, there is another reason for expanding the debate 
about the consequences of migration for those left behind beyond economic considerations 
and it is one that emerges from a well-known objection of liberalism in debates about 
distributive justice.  This is the deep structure objection where liberalism is held to be 
incapable in principle of attending to the problem of deep structural inequality because of its 
normative focus upon the individual.  Precisely, that is, because it is only concerned with 
defending the rights and liberties of individuals to pursue their ends, liberalism is normatively 
blind to the aggregate results of their doing so, especially where these adversely affect the 
liberties, opportunities and life chances of others.  In debates about migration and justice the 
deep structure objection serves as the basis for a slightly different criticism of what we will 
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call the permissive or more open borders stance that I will defend.  But before seeing why it 
is necessary to see what kind of a stance the more open borders stance is.  First, this stance 
acknowledges that there may be other considerations - for example, national security and the 
control of highly contagious lethal diseases - that ought to dissuade us from defending fully 
open borders where there are no restrictions upon movement whatsoever.ii  My position, 
therefore, is not a wholly permissive one and accepts a rôle for the state in determining who 
crosses international boundaries.  Secondly, the term ‘more open borders’ is intended to 
capture the related idea that this stance is but one of several that may appear along what we 
may call a spectrum of permissiveness with regard to migration.  Occupying a spot near to 
the fully open borders stance, it may thus be contrasted with less permissive stances such as 
those defended, from a diversity of normative standpoints (including liberal standpoints) and 
for different reasons by Blake (2016a; 2016b; 2017) Brock (2009; Brock and Blake, 2015), 
Miller (2016), Pevnick (2011) Wellman (2008; 2011; 2016) and Ypi (2008; 2012).  A more 
open borders stance, then, is just one that liberals and, indeed, those working in other 
traditions, may defend.   
 How, then, does the deep structure objection present a special challenge to a liberal 
defence of more open borders?  Here it is claimed that even if they are beneficial with respect 
to poverty’s symptoms, more open borders are not only be blind to the deep structural causes 
of poverty in poorer states because they would permit individuals to migrate without regard 
for the consequences of this for their country of origin’s economic well-being or institutions.  
They are complicit in the perpetuation of those structures precisely because they appear 
indifferent to the question of how those structures may be transformed, for instance via policy 
devices such as immigration restrictions (Miller, 2016) or qualified emigration restrictions 
and compulsory service programmes (Brock and Blake 2015: 48-51, 73-9; Ypi, 2008).  
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 In this paper I will respond to the deep structure objection and claim that there is good 
reason to defend more open borders in the interests of those left behind not just on economic 
but on political and cultural grounds.iii  More specifically, and even if there are at least some 
grounds for restricting migration, I will claim that the deep structure objection is not one of 
them.  In the section that follows I will outline three variants of the deep structure objection 
that have appeared in debates about migration justice.  In section 3 I will then build a liberal 
response that draws upon two distinct literatures: the theory and practice of political activism 
(Wright, 2010; Ypi, 2012) and the epistemic approach to liberalism (Tebble, 2016).  The 
culmination of this will be the claim, in section 4, that more open borders facilitate the 
international remittance of the norms and values required to transform the deep structures that 
cause poverty in poorer states.  Finally, after responding to objections in section 5, in section 
6 I will consider the extent to which the arguments presented here provide compelling 
reasons for those who are sceptical of more open borders to endorse them nonetheless, and 
what implications, if any, they may have for deep structure critiques of liberalism in general. 
 
2. Liberalism, deep structure and migration 
One of the notable earlier incarnations of deep structure objection to liberalism is to be found 
in the work of Wood (1972), MacPherson (1973), Wolff (1977), Nielsen (1978) and Simpson 
(1980) on distributive justice.  For these authors capitalist relations of production are 
responsible for, but ultimately incapable of adequately addressing, deep structural inequality 
because of their liberal individualist normative focus.  That is, by focusing on the liberty of 
the individual to exploit rights to property, liberalism is silent with regard to the unequal 
results of their doing so.  Subsequent to this feminist theorists (Pateman, 1988; Okin, 1989) 
extended the logic of the deep structure objection to debates about the inequalities 
perpetuated by gendered family relations and, most notably, by the public/private distinction.  
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Again, the central insight is that liberalism’s individualist focus means that it as conceptually 
blind to the underlying processes that led to the gendered division of labour and 
systematically diminished opportunities and life chances for women and girls.  Combining 
many of these insights, Iris Marion Young (1990: 18-30; 2009) brought the underlying logic 
of the deep structure objection to bear with regard to liberalism’s blindness to the effects of 
systematic processes of discrimination, domination and oppression upon members of 
marginalised groups. 
 In debate about migration and justice there are at least three versions of the deep 
structure objection to a permissive stance towards migration.  For David Miller (2007) and 
Thomas Pogge (1997) the remittance based case for more open borders is inadequate as a 
response to poverty because it fails to attend to those systematic features of poorer state’s 
institutions, such as entrenched corruption, that account for poverty and arrested rates of 
development.iv  Thus, even if they go some way to addressing the symptoms of poverty, 
remittances and the more open borders that they require do little to address its underlying 
deep structural causes.  Addressing this issue from a different angle Peter Higgins (2008: 
532-3) approaches the question of deep structure and migration through the lens of broadly 
identitarian concerns.  When one factors in the gendered, racialised and class-based economic 
structures and processes that not only explain why the poorest are poor but who the poorest 
typically are, it stands to reason that more open borders are not only likely to fail to address 
the underlying causes of poverty and economic inequality, they may reinforce and perpetuate 
them by entrenching the privilege of those with the resources to take advantage of the liberty 
to migrate and send remittances home.v   
 There is a third sense in which the deep structure objection is reflected in recent 
critiques of more permissive approaches to migration.  As Gillian Brock  (Brock and Blake, 
2015: 38-41; Brock 2016; 2017: 157, n. 6) and Lea Ypi (2008; 2012) have claimed, the 
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benefits flowing from emigration - typically the remittances that immigrants send home - are 
insufficient to compensate for the costs that brain-drain imposes upon the development of 
poorer countries’ institutions.  More specifically, they claim that proponents of more open 
borders and immigrant remittances fail to consider the question of how a society’s institutions 
are to be improved if citizens with valuable skills are incentivised to leave by the lure of 
higher wages and better opportunities.  This is not to say, of course, that Brock does not 
accept, in keeping with the empirical literature, that remittances are both large (Brock and 
Blake, 2015:42) and of at least some economic benefit, either directly or indirectly (Brock 
and Blake, 2015:44).  Yet, she claims that there is also a compelling sense in which, even if 
true, this misses a more fundamental point, for there is no obvious sense in which, absent an 
account of how they ‘have good institution-building effects ... remittances can be the main 
vehicle for transforming poor developing counties into the kinds of places that can provide 
reasonably decent life prospects for all citizens’ (Brock and Blake, 2015:44, emphasis 
added).  ‘People build institutions’, she (Brock and Blake, 2015:39) reminds us, ‘and the 
skilled people who leave are potentially important institution builders’.  Similarly, Ypi 
(2008:409) claims that ‘[t]he principles according to which ... restrictions upon emigration 
may be placed must take into account how much the productive contribution of prospective 
emigrants affects the institutions of the source state.’  Thus, even if more open borders are 
uniquely placed to encourage poverty alleviation via remittances, they do not address the 
underlying structural processes that act as poverty’s drivers and the impact that the exodus of 
the most talented and best educated may have on a sending society’s institutions, particularly 
those that would strengthen its prospects for deep structural transformation and development.  
Without an answer to these objections, and regardless of the findings of empirical social 
science either for or against remittances, the case for more open borders is at best an 
incomplete one.  
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 The problems posed for the justification of more open borders do not end with their 
defenders being condemned for failing to address the problem of deep structure.  Precisely 
because they make exit from poorer states possible, more open borders serve merely as 
political safety-valves for indifferent governments to rid themselves of restive populations 
and sources of popular resistance that may lead to social and political reform over the long 
term.  This concern is highlighted by Kieran Oberman for whom more open borders should 
only be a policy option of last resort.  One of the two central rights appealed to by Oberman 
(2015: 243-7; 2016a) is the right to stay in one’s country and not be compelled to cross 
international borders to fulfil one’s basic needs.  It is in this connection that he finds more 
open borders wanting, for in acting as safety valves for the coercive pressure placed upon the 
poor to leave their home country, they are complicit in undermining the right to stay.  ‘When 
rich states rely on migration to address poverty, instead of searching for alternatives,’ 
Oberman (2015: 249; 2011) argues, ‘they fail in this regard’.  Not only, then, must liberals in 
favour of more open borders respond to the claim that they are blind to deep structure.  They 
must also deal with the question, of how poorer states’ deep structures and institutions may 
be transformed.   
 
3. Prelude to a liberal response: Erik Olin Wright and interstitial transformation 
As we have seen, there are, then, two related aspects of the deep structure objection to which 
liberal defenders of more open borders need to respond; one pertaining to the positive 
question of social ontology and liberalism’s capacity to recognise deep structure as a 
problem, the other to the normative question of the preconditions for deep structural 
transformation and institutional reform.  With regard to the first, one way to see how 
liberalism may not be as myopic as its critics suggest is to invoke Erik Olin Wright’s notion 
of the interstitial transformation of capitalist relations of production.  In Envisioning Real 
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Utopias (2010: 323) Wright conceives of social and political change taking place either from 
the bottom-up, via the enactment of alternative social relations in the gaps or ‘interstices’ of 
‘an organization, of a society, or even of global capitalism,’ or via a top-down process, 
conceived either in terms of the seizure of the state (for communists) or of reformist electoral 
coalitions (for social democrats).  In the case of the former deep structural transformation 
occurs in the interstices of the state and the market precisely because capitalist power 
relations and principles of social organisation ‘do not govern all of the activities occurring 
within’ the system (Wright, 2010: 323).  Precisely, that is, because individuals enjoy at least 
some degree of liberty they may bring about social change without interference.  
Significantly for present purposes, within this bottom-up or endogenous category of 
transformation Wright also distinguishes between what we may call self-conscious interstitial 
transformation - that is, interstitial strategies exemplified by movements such as Occupy 
Wall Street or Femen - and unintended or invisible hand interstitial transformative processes.  
In contrast to the self-conscious formation of activist strategies of the former that involve ‘the 
deliberate development of interstitial activities for the purpose of fundamental transformation 
of the system as a whole’ (Wright, 2010: 323), and where the ideals to be strived for in the 
activist space are a result of deliberation, the transformation resultant from interstitial 
processes is an unintended consequence of a myriad of discrete decisions taken by individual 
actors.  Individual actors, therefore, can be said to participate in the transformation of deep 
structure, even if often only accidentally so.  It is also with this epistemic understanding in 
mind that I (Tebble, 2018) advance an argument for freedom of movement between states 
because of the intended, and crucially unintended, poverty alleviating effects of immigrant 
remittances.   
 To be sure, and, as this suggests, it would be advisable to proceed with a degree of 
ideological caution when utilising Wright to build a liberal response to the deep structure 
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objection.  His discussion, after all, takes place within the context of an enquiry into the 
possibility of the transformation of capitalist relations of production, something with which 
one may reasonably expect the liberal approach defended here would have little sympathy.  
This normative difference notwithstanding, Wright’s account of interstitial processes in 
particular is noteworthy for the common invisible-hand logic of transformation that it shares 
with liberal accounts of markets.  As Wright (2010: 324) explains by way of reference to the 
transformation of feudal relations of production, ‘the urban artisans and merchants in feudal 
society whose interstitial activities fostered new kinds of  [capitalist] relations did not have a 
project of destroying feudal class relations and forging a new kind of society.’  Rather, the 
changes they effected were ‘the unintended by-products of their activities, not a strategy as 
such’ (Wright 2010: 324).  Thus, despite a very different normative starting point, Wright’s 
approach to the transformation of relations of production is a promising one, precisely 
because of the rôle that it suggests individuals acting either alone or in concert within a 
framework of (liberal) rights and liberties play in it.  
 
Transformative activism and the problem of après-garde political agency 
Thus far we have invoked the work of Wright to argue that liberalism is not blind to deep 
structure.  There is, however, another more profound conceptual rather than normative risk in 
seeking to make common cause with him when conceiving of deep structural transformation 
in liberal terms.  Precisely because his is a two-pronged endogenous account of structural 
transformation, it is unclear how a coherent candidate conception of a better future to be 
strategically agitated for in the activist space could be formulated without direct experience 
of its specifics.  Importantly, what Wright (2010: 321) calls this problem of ‘the history of the 
future’ is also manifested in David Miller’s (2013) critique of Lea Ypi’s work on avant-garde 
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conceptions of political agency and global justice, so it will be worthwhile considering it as 
we build our liberal response.   
 In Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency (2012) Ypi she sets out a vision 
of political transformation in which a vanguard of committed activists, critical of the status 
quo, play a central rôle in defining the transformative ideals that ought to be realised in 
practice.  The problem with Ypi’s approach for Miller, however, is that it is unclear how 
these ideals can be agreed upon and agitated for if one has no clear idea of the future that one 
wishes to bring about.  This difficulty of ‘pre-figurative politics’ (Levitas, 2013) - where 
activists must first imagine and only then enact the ideals they wish to realise - shows how 
self-conscious strategic transformation must be preceded by imagining what a better world 
would look like.  Thus, regardless of how unhappy we may be with dominant structures and 
processes, ex ante judgments about which future may serve as an appropriate vision for 
interstitial transformative activism and avant-garde political agency in the present are very 
difficult if not impossible to make.  Of course, such judgments can be made ex post, once the 
history of what was once the future has been written.  ‘If we know which way the army has 
marched,’ Miller explains (2013:94), ‘then we can rewind the historical clock and identify the 
individuals and groups who were out in front pointing the way,’ as the cases of women’s 
suffrage and the abolition of slavery show.  However, such retrospective judgments are of 
little use in the present conditions within which activist communities must organise, given 
that there may be a myriad of groups who wish to effect social change of one kind or another.  
As Miller (2013:95) claims, what we desire in such a situation is ‘to be able to say now, with 
respect to contemporaries, which are instances of avant-garde practice and which aren’t’.  
This, of course, is no easy matter without getting the relationship between avant-garde 
political agency and the principles we are supposed to develop ‘back to front’ (Miller 2013: 
95-6).vi  We may say, therefore, that for Miller the problem with avant-garde political agency 
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is that it rests upon an epistemic illusion.  Ypi’s activists for global justice are, at best, the 
top-down exogenous bearers of après-garde political agency.  
 In response one could claim that Miller’s critique misses its target.  Activists can get 
an idea of the ideals to be strategically realised by learning from one another.  On this reading 
civil society and the interstices between it and the state become zones of activist 
experimentation where different groups seek to realise their goals and communicate the 
results of their endeavours to one another.  But it is here where another difficulty presents 
itself that pertains not only to Ypi’s top-down account of transformation, but also to our 
concern to utilises Wright’s approach to develop a bottom-up account of deep structural 
transformation in poorer states.  Unlike the case within wealthier states, where rights to 
protest and engage in other kinds of activity that secure activist experimentation are typically 
protected and culturally entrenched, in poorer states this may not the case.  In such cases the 
question therefore arises as to how, in addition to those values and ideals that have already 
been settled upon, it would be possible to learn which others to adopt in the absence of direct 
exposure to them?  It seems that like Ypi, Wright’s model of interstitial transformation, and 
with it the prospects of an account of liberal transformation in poorer states, fails because it 
begs the question of the source of transformative ideals.   
 
4. Epistemic liberalism, structural transformation and the bypassing of the state 
Such a conclusion, however, would be premature, for more open borders help us to address 
Miller’s concerns and the question of how transformative values and ideals are 
communicated to those who have no direct experience of them by internationalising Wight’s 
conception of interstitial transformation.  On this reading Wright’s interstices - where the 
history of the future may at least in part come to be written - are no longer understood only as 
the underexploited gaps between civil society and the state within poorer societies.  Rather, 
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they may also be understood as gaps in the international governance architecture that may be 
exploited by a liberalisation of migration policy that makes possible the interstitial bypassing 
of the state from outside its borders in the interests of deep structural transformation.  Central 
here is the notion of differences in political culture between states, where these are 
understood not as unfortunate facts of life but as resources that, when exploited by what we 
may call political entrepreneurs, make possible the transformation of the lived presents of 
those in wealthier states into prefigurable future of those in poorer states.   
 How, then, does the epistemic liberal standpoint enable us to work up an account of 
more open borders facilitating the international remittance of the norms and values required 
for envisioning and agitating for deep structural transformation in poorer states?  Relevant in 
this connection is epistemic liberalism’s origins as an economic theory that explains the 
consequences of the operation of markets for the coordination of knowledge.vii  Central to 
this standpoint is the relationship between economic liberty and the communication of the 
knowledge of the conditions which we must take into account in order to pursue our 
individual and collective ends successfully.  Thus, when the price of a good or resource rises 
its consumers are informed of the consequences of a change in conditions of which they 
would otherwise have no knowledge, but which they need to know about in order to adjust 
their own actions accordingly.  Most importantly for present purposes, for exponents of this 
view it is only when we are left at liberty to buy and sell rights to property that the prices 
upon which we rely to coordinate our activities arise.  Moreover, and as we shall see when 
we respond to some possible objections to our argument, it is not the claim of epistemic 
liberals that only if we commit to liberty will prosperity follow, or that a specific preferred 
distribution of resources will come about.  Rather it is to claim that a normative commitment 
to liberty will make it more likely that these outcomes will follow because it is more likely 
that economic coordination will take place.   
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 Crucially, these epistemic considerations are not just pertinent to questions of the 
communication of economic knowledge.  The underlying logic of the epistemic liberal 
account of economic coordination also serves as a foundation of an account of how another 
kind of liberty - liberty of movement - stimulates the remittance of norms, ideals and other 
intangible goods across international borders.  The advantages of liberty in this respect are 
discussed by Hillel Rapoport (2017: 128) in his response to Brock’s argument for qualified 
migration controls as a means of combating brain-drain.  He notes that in addition to sending 
remittances to countries of origin that aid in poverty alleviation, immigrants also participate 
in the formation of ‘diaspora networks that serve as bridges between host and home 
countries’ and whose benefits manifest in several ways.viii   
 The first epistemic advantage of diaspora networks are ‘information channel[s]’ 
(Rapoport, 2017: 129).  Here it is the cultural commonality between migrants and those they 
leave behind that results in a reduction of transaction costs between countries of origin and 
host countries.  But there are other advantages to diaspora networks that offer the chance to 
internationalise Wright’s conception of interstitial strategies.  As Rapoport (2016: 128-9) has 
made clear, in addition to the setting up of economic networks that facilitate the transmission 
of new technological and other forms of knowledge, diaspora communities may self-
consciously organise to achieve specific political goals via sympathetic intermediaries in 
countries of origin.ix  Experiences acquired in wealthier states in this sense provide a 
foundation upon which diaspora communities may come not only to see that corruption and 
discrimination, for example, do not have to remain unchallengeable aspects of the political 
order of their countries of origin.  Precisely because they find themselves outside the 
structures that are the target of their activism, this experience can be acted upon in a variety 
of ways to bring about institutional reform and deep structural transformation through the 
self-conscious strategic exertion of political influence that often accompanies their relative 
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wealth.  Importantly for our wider case, the remittance of such interstitial strategies is 
dependent upon the degree to which borders are more rather than less open.   
 So much, then, for more open borders and interstitial strategies.  How may they be 
serviceable to Wright’s interstitial processes of norm remittance to poorer states in 
furtherance of deep structural transformation?  In the economic realm this invisible-hand 
knowledge transfer process occurs through what Rapoport (2017: 129) calls ‘knowledge 
diffusion channel[s]’ where ‘migrants transfer knowledge, including technological 
knowledge ... from the host to the home economy’ (2017: 128).  Indeed, we can say that the 
flow of technologies across borders occurs in tandem with the flow of goods, particularly 
when the benefits of reverse engineering and technological repurposing are taken into 
account.  Here when a good is sent across borders the idea that inspired it and a significant 
chunk of the know-how embedded in the production process that led to its manufacture (most 
obviously in the materials used and the manner in which they are combined) is also sent 
without this being the express intention of the sender.  
 Importantly, the flow of such intangible goods is not limited to technological and 
production process knowledge.  Most notably for present purposes, and again citing 
numerous empirical studies, Rapoport (2017: 129) also includes ‘social norms, preferences 
and values (e.g. preferences for lower fertility or for democracy)’ on the list.  Thus, in 
keeping with Wright’s account, the transformative process that liberty of movement across 
international borders facilitates is an invisible-hand one insofar as it is more often than not 
the case that it is a result of the actions of individuals who intend no such result.  Just as they 
do not have generalised economic benefits for unknown others in mind when sending 
remittances, immigrants do not think either about transforming the deep structures or the 
institutions of the states they leave behind, or about remitting norms, values and other 
intangible goods to activists to make this possible.  Like the artisans and merchants of 
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Wright’s (2010: 324) example, who ‘were simply engaged in profit-seeking activities, 
adapting to the opportunities and possibilities of the society in which they lived,’ immigrants 
typically just want to improve their own (economic) lot and that of those closest to them, with 
any structurally transformative effects being a cumulative and unintended result of their 
discrete decisions.   
 It is clear that in addition to being understood as members of strategically self-
organising diaspora communities, the epistemic liberal standpoint makes conceptual room for 
a reading of immigrants as accidental political entrepreneurs.  Here the cross border 
interstitial process of transformation is a cumulative result of communication between 
immigrants and family and friends back home, either through periodic visits or, ever-
increasingly, via the internet and social media.  Under such circumstances immigrants do not 
necessarily self-consciously encourage those left behind to engage in transformative activism 
(although some may).  Rather, those left behind have their expectations of their states 
transformed both via the communication to them of the lived experiences of their loved ones 
abroad and by viewing them as examples worthy of emulation.   
 Significantly, it is the interstitial process of norm remittance that feeds into the 
formulation of self-conscious interstitial strategies insofar as the discrete changes in attitudes 
brought about by contact with expatriates lends itself to the cultivation of interstitial activist 
communities that subsequently agitate for change.  The relationship between interstitial 
processes and interstitial strategies thus represents an epistemic interface between accidental 
but nonetheless vital dissemination of transformative ideals and their wider self-conscious 
adoption.  Central here is the rôle of activist communities in countries of origin that learn of 
newly remitted norms and values.  Upon doing so they may subsequently self-consciously 
adopt them to realise their own ‘political experiments of living’ - where different forms of 
governance and relations of authority within them are concretely realised.  Thus, in response 
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to the deep structural and institutional concerns of sceptics of more open borders, we can 
imagine such communities adopting recently disseminated norms of racial justice, gender 
equality, or of institutional transparency and accountability to re-imagine the organisation of 
their own activist spaces.  Furthermore, it is in virtue of this self-conscious adoption of norms 
whose origin is in interstitial processes that such activist communities may subsequently hold 
their own re-imagined structures of authority up as alternative forms of governance and 
authority for society at large, including for their own states.  Most significantly, however, it is 
only to the extent that borders are more open that the norm remittance required for the 
internationalisation of interstitial deep structural transformation can take place.    
 
5. Empirical social science, pattern prediction and the politics of likelihood 
Thus far we have established that in invoking the work of Wright liberal defenders of more 
open borders are able to offer an account of endogenous transformation, via interstitial norm 
remittance, of the structures and institutions that are at the root of poverty in poorer states.  
To be sure, one may concede that our argument represents a powerful conceptual possibility, 
yet still remain unconvinced by it for at least two sets of reasons that relate to the empirical 
and ethical aspects of the argument.  First, what evidence is there to show that norm 
remittance and deep structural transformation under a more open borders regime is anything 
more than theoretical conjecture?  In contrast to the remittance-based economic variant of 
this argument, where transaction paper trails are abundant, there is no corresponding evidence 
for the remittance of norms and political values.  Beyond this empirical concern there is also 
the question of the ethical standing of the more open borders argument.  How, that is, will 
such a process be guaranteed to issue in transformative outcomes of the appropriate kind?  It 
would be no argument for more open borders if their likely effect were to be neutral or even 
harmful for the prospects of deep structural transformation or institutional reform, or if they 
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ended up fortifying values that undermined the prospects of liberal democracy.  Third, why 
should one assume, somewhat patronisingly, that transformation can only occur in a 
unidirectional manner from wealthier to poorer states and, fourth, are we not assuming a 
culturally imperialistic stance with regard to the kind of values that we may hope and expect 
to be remitted, no matter how attractive they may be to those of us in wealthier states?  Who, 
after all, gets to decide which norms and values are the appropriate ones? 
 With respect to the first and second objections, and as work on the microanalysis of 
diaspora involvement in the politics of countries of origin has shown (Levitt, 1998; Levitt and 
Lamba-Nieves, 2011; Newland, 2004: 14-23), norm remittance by immigrants is more than a 
mere conceptual possibility in the case of both strategic and invisible hand transformation.  
More specifically, with regards to the strategic communication of liberal democratic norms, 
Dedieu et al (2012) have found that a majority of those expatriate Senegalese in France and 
the United States who were surveyed actively encouraged relatives back home to register to 
vote and similar conclusions have been reached in the studies of Shain and Barth (2003) and 
Hladnik (2009).  Similarly, with respect to invisible-hand processes both Coyne and 
Williamson (2012) and Rauch (2001) have provided empirical evidence to support the claim 
that a more open stance leads to improvements in governance.x  Moreover, and taking the 
example of the country with the highest rate of emigration from Africa as an example, Batista 
and Vicente (2011) have shown that households in Cape Verde with a migrant were more 
likely to take part in lobbying for better governance.xi  With regard to the remittance of norms 
and democratic reform both Spilimbergo (2009) and Docquier et al (2011) have found that 
emigration to wealthier democratic states encourages democratisation in countries of origin.  
Moreover, studies have also shown not only empirically verifiable increased election turnouts 
amongst populations who live near immigrant returnees from developed democracies, but 
that this is due not to explicit strategic instruction from the latter but rather to a process of 
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imitation of them by the former.xii  Perhaps most significantly, this imitation was undertaken 
by those often considered hardest to reach by activists; namely returnees’ less well educated 
neighbours (Chauvet and Mercier 2014; Mahmoud, Rapoport, Steinmayr and Trebesch 
2013).   
 Of course, it could be objected that, even if true, this amounts to very little evidence 
and that we therefore have little reason to adopt a more open borders stance.  If there really 
were such a connection, surely one would see evidence for it that is both voluminous and 
widespread?  Yet, this objection rests upon a misunderstanding of the rôle of empirical 
evidence in our argument.  To see why we need to invoke epistemic liberal Friedrich Hayek’s 
(1967a: 35; 1967b) distinction between tendencies or ‘pattern predictions’ - ‘which will 
appear if certain general conditions are satisfied’ - and ‘predictions of specific phenomena’ or 
outcomes.  As this distinction suggests pattern predictions are hypothetical characterisations 
of what is likely to occur given certain conditions but which make no predictive claims about 
specific cases or, crucially, about whether such conditions do or will hold.xiii  In the case of 
more open borders we cannot claim which specific norms will be remitted, or the extent to 
which they will be remitted, as this would be dependent upon a host of other factors including 
the cultural disposition of immigrants, the background norms and values of the society into 
which they enter and the receptivity to new ideas of those they have left behind but with 
whom they maintain ties (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011).  Rather, the claim is that if 
individuals are permitted to cross international borders, norm remittance will be the likely 
outcome.  Far, then, from undermining the confidence one may have in our argument for a 
necessary connection between more open borders and the remittance of norms, in a world of 
relatively closed borders from which the evidence for norm remittance is currently taken a 
relative paucity of evidence is precisely what our epistemic standpoint would suggest.  The 
important conceptual point, therefore, is not that more open borders will issue in specific 
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kinds of norm remittance, deep structural transformation and institutional reform in the 
interests of poverty alleviation.  It is that we have epistemically grounded reasons to believe 
that not adopting more open borders is likely to diminish the prospects of all three.    
 The notion of pattern prediction is also significant with regard to the second objection.  
As Levitt (1998: 941-3) and Newland (2004: 19-20) have also pointed out, there is of course 
no guarantee that the norms and values for whose transmission we have claimed more open 
borders are necessary will be those which will stimulate deep structural transformation and 
institutional reform, or for that matter be ones with which liberal democrats would 
necessarily be happy.  Unlike the economic case, where the evidence for the connection 
between more open borders and poverty alleviation is strong, this does not appear to be the 
case with norm remittance and specifically liberal democratic outcomes.  Yet, the claim that 
liberal democratic outcomes are not guaranteed should not be particularly worrisome for our 
defence of more open borders.  Our claim is that it is more likely that liberal democratic 
norms will be transferred to the extent that migrants are permitted to enter liberal democratic 
societies and, by contrast, less likely to the extent that they are not.  (One would, after all, 
hardly send migrants to a totalitarian state to increase the likelihood of the transfer of liberal 
democratic norms back home.)  Thus, even if liberal democratic outcomes are not guaranteed, 
this does not provide compelling grounds for rejecting the stance defended here.  Similarly to 
the question of empirical evidence, we have ample conceptual reason to conclude that the 
extent to which wealthier states do not adopt more open borders will be extent to which the 
prospects of liberal democratic transformation in the interests of poverty alleviation will be 
diminished, not that having more open borders will guarantee it.   
 For similar reasons I do not wish to claim, with regard to the third and fourth 
objections, that deep structural transformation can only occur through a one-way culturally 
imperialist process of norm remittance from wealthier, and presumably ‘advanced’, states to 
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poorer, ‘less’ advanced, ones.  Rather, the norms and values remitted via more open borders 
are what we may call candidate norms and values.  These may, or may not, be taken up, 
either alone or in combination with others, first by immigrants and subsequently by their 
friends and family back home and activist communities in the light of their own 
understandings of what is of value.  Most significantly, the objection about who gets to 
decide upon values, norms and transformative ideals betrays a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the epistemic argument.  The whole point of that argument, invoking as we have seen 
Wright’s notion of interstitial processes, is that there is an important sense in which, as a 
bottom-up process, the epistemic liberal account is implicitly anti-imperialistic because 
nobody gets to decide.  Rather, to the extent that it can be characterised as such, the ‘decision’ 
about appropriate ideals is one that is an emergent result of the actions of countless 
immigrants.xiv  Thus, and again in the spirit of the distinction between the prediction of 
specific outcomes and general or ‘pattern’ predictions, the claim is that more open borders 
are likely to stimulate the remittance of additional values that activist communities may 
subsequently choose to adopt but to which, crucially, they would otherwise not have access 
without more open borders, not that these are the only values that should be adopted.   
 
6. Deep structural transformation and less open borders 
We claimed at the outset of this enquiry that the more open borders position can be located 
along a spectrum of permissiveness with regard to movement across international borders that 
goes as far as an open- or no borders stance.  Before concluding, therefore, and to ascertain 
the desirability of our normative stance, it will be useful to critically contrast it with two rival 
viewpoints that, in different ways and with different concerns in mind, reject it.   
 We may agree with Miller when he argues that it would be a mistake to think of 
poverty alleviation as being only about the needs of the world’s poorest being met by the 
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rich.  Doing this, he (2007, 260) insightfully reminds us, ‘focuses our attention away from the 
institutional changes that might eventually serve to end or at least radically diminish world 
poverty’.xv  Yet, the question of which institutional reforms are required presents a significant 
problem for his view when understood in the light of his critique of avant-garde political 
agency.  Importantly, this problem emerges regardless of what kind of state we imagine the 
state of a poorer country to be with regard to institutional reform, for in both cases Miller’s 
claim that Ypi’s conception of avant-garde agency offers no account of how we may identify 
which principles in virtue of which deep structural and institutional reform may be 
undertaken also applies to him.   
 In the first instance, those in positions of power within poorer countries may not for 
reasons of self-interest be interested in identifying them, so it may be down to activist 
communities to force their hand.  Yet, as was the case with his critique of Ypi, it is unclear 
from where they would draw the principles and values from.  Indeed, their capacity to draw 
upon such resources from beyond their borders would be diminished to the extent that Miller 
rejects more rather than less open borders.  It is here, moreover, where Miller’s scepticism of 
more open borders presents another problem, for if it is the case that poorer states do not wish 
to enact reform it may be the case that wealthier countries would have to step in.  Yet, even if 
they are motivated to do so, wealthier states will also be faced with a similar problem of 
identification, if at the same time they endorse Miller’s scepticism about immigration and 
thus makes the remittance of transformative norms less likely.  Even, then, if one should 
concur with Miller’s objection to Ypi, his scepticism about immigration means that his own 
position is susceptible to it because it begs the question of how one may identify the norms 
appropriate for deep structural transformation and institutional reform given the specific 
contexts of poorer countries.   
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 Of course, Miller may reply here that we can identify which principles and values are 
appropriate.  We need look no further than the post-WWII history of the Western liberal 
democracies in order to see what these norms are and how successful they have been at 
raising living standards.  Moreover, richer states would not have to liberalise immigration 
policy in order to remit these principles abroad.  Rather, they could engage in diplomacy and 
appeal to moral principle to persuade poorer states to attend to the deep structural causes of 
poverty within their borders.  Of course, it may be the case that appeals to moral principle 
prove ineffective.  Yet even here this does not necessitate more open borders, for wealthier 
states could appeal to self-interest - that it is in the long-term economic or political interest of 
a poorer state to change its ways.   
 Yet, if the government of a poorer state is indifferent to these arguments - perhaps 
because elites and office holders within it stand to lose too much by adopting a policy of 
reform - then change will gain no impetus.  Poverty’s sources, it seems, are beyond the reach 
of wealthier states where the indifference of local actors acts as an obstacle to it.  Under such 
circumstances one may resort to more coercive tools of persuasion; economic and other kinds 
of sanctions being particularly well-known examples.  Again, however, those with power in 
poorer states may still consider sanctions a price well worth paying if it means that the status 
quo is left unchallenged, as was the case for example in Rhodesia.  As a last resort, wealthier 
states could entertain the use of military intervention to effect regime change.  Yet, beyond 
the potentially grave human and material costs of this for wealthier states - as the experience 
of the Iraq War shows - resorting to direct intervention is likely to be self-defeating insofar as 
it would result at least over the short to medium term in increased rather than decreased 
poverty, as well as profound social disruption in the poorer states that are subject to it.   
 In contrast to Miller, Brock does not have to contend with the challenge that 
indifferent elites present and, therefore, with the problems attendant to the exogenous 
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imposition of norms.  Indeed, as a measure designed to encourage institutional development 
at home her defence of qualified emigration controls and compulsory service programmes is 
emblematic of a poorer state that has the best of intentions.  This notwithstanding, there are at 
least two reasons to greet her proposal with scepticism.  First, the brain-drain objection upon 
which her arguments for these measures rest underdetermines the transformative effects that 
we have seen accompany more open borders.  Even if more open borders issue in an outflow 
of skilled individuals, not only would their monetary remittances offset the economic costs of 
this, their remittance of norms and values in the other direction - what we may call reverse 
brain-drain - would be an additional offsetting phenomenon.  It was for such reasons, for 
instance, that the Nkrumah government started a scheme of subsidised airfares to encourage 
Ghanaian youth to visit the UK in the 1960s ‘to get an idea of where he wanted to take his 
country’ (Easterly and Nyarko 2008: 2).  Thus, rather than undermining institution building, 
more open borders are likely to facilitate the remittance of the values that encourages it.   
 Secondly, emigration restrictions are not only unnecessary because liberty of 
movement can function in this endogenously transformative way.  Precisely because they 
indirectly restrict cross-border norm remittance from wealthier to poorer states, emigration 
restrictions also ultimately lessen the prospects for the kind of effective strategic activism 
that leads to deep structural transformation.  This notwithstanding, our final assessment of 
Brock must itself be qualified because her proposal applies only to those individuals who 
obtain their skills via state funded education and training.  Nevertheless, and even if such 
restrictions are a part of the contractual obligations that individuals enter into when choosing 
a state funded education, we have persuasive epistemic reasons to suggest that there may be 
little reason to endorse them.   
 
The rôle of the state 
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It is at this juncture where one may advance the claim that the error of proponents of 
restrictions upon migration on the basis of the deep structure objection is that they reduce 
deep structural transformation to a political project, rather than as a process that may come 
about as a result of the exercise of the liberty to cross international boundaries  Yet, to do so 
would be a mistake for the argument made here should not be construed as part of a wider set 
of arguments about the desirability of anarchy.  Whilst the deep structural transformation that 
more open borders make possible is an endogenous process that in many fundamental 
respects bypasses the state, the political decision to secure the rights and liberties that makes 
it possible is not (Levitt, 1998: 944).  In this most general sense, therefore, and as our earlier 
depiction of the normative terrain of migration justice as a spectrum of permissibility of 
movement suggested, the more open borders stance defended here belongs in the same statist 
stable as its less permissive cousins, liberal or otherwise.  
 Moreover, our argument shows that the error of the critics may be more than the 
misrecognition of liberalism’s capacity to deal with questions of deep structure.  It may be the 
case that deep structural transformation is a predictable result of the application of liberal 
principles across a range of issues with which political philosophers may be concerned.  
Regrettably, whether this liberal account of deep structural transformation can be applied to 
address profoundly significant questions pertaining to economic inequality and capitalist 
relations of production, to gender relations and the family as a site of injustice, or to cultural 
imperialism, discrimination and the socio-economic positioning of members of marginalized 
groups is a question that must be postponed until another occasion.   
 
7. Conclusion 
In building a response to the deep structure objection to more open borders that draws upon 
work on avant-garde political agency, the theory and practice of political activism and the 
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epistemic approach to liberalism, I have defended more open borders on the grounds of their 
transformative effects upon the conditions that cause poverty in poorer states.  Here new 
ideas concerning good governance and the benefits of living under it are transferred in a 
diversity of ways across borders, but only insofar as individuals are permitted to enter 
countries where such values and institutions are already entrenched.   
 More specifically, we have seen that the deep structural and institutional changes 
required to transform the conditions that prompt individuals in poorer states to seek better 
lives elsewhere cannot be conjured up ex nihilo either by poorer states themselves, where 
they are willing to do so, or by concerned but distant wealthier states.  Far from being 
complicit in the perpetuation of deep structural injustice or in the diminishment of the 
prospects for institutional development, therefore, more open borders represent an 
endogenous, context-sensitive and non-coercive means of effecting deep structural 
transformation and institutional reform.  Whilst there may be at least some good reasons for 
restricting the movement of people across international borders, deep structural concerns and 
worries about the effects of brain-drain upon institution building are not among them.  For 
this reason justice requires more open borders. 
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conditions but as an evaluative standpoint from which to judge their non-ideal performance, 
was its tendency to assume away the question of how agents are able to coordinate their 
activities to make this happen in the absence of full knowledge of the conditions relevant to 
doing so.  Thus, rather than explain how agents come to know of those conditions beyond 
their own locality to which they must refer if they are to clear markets - but of which, 
crucially, they know nothing - perfect equilibrium assumes this question away in positing a 
state of affairs in which markets have already cleared.  Similarly, the problem for avant-
garde political agency is that it assumes knowledge of the transformative values and ideals 
that ought to be realised in the absence of an explanation of how activist communities come 
to avail themselves of them. 
vii For as overview see Tebble (2013). 
viii To be sure Brock (2017: 157) acknowledges this when noting that ‘those who migrate can 
facilitate new trading or other opportunities for citizens in countries of origin.’ 
ix See also Betts and Jones (2016), Brock (2017: 157), Burgess (2012) and Koslowski (2005). 
x See also Ivlevs and King (2017) and Tyburski (2012). 
xi See also Peréz-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) and Easterly and Nyarko (2008:25-6).   
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claim is that if we permit individuals to buy and sell rights to property, we can be sure that 
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owing to the complexities of modern economies, we cannot predict what these prices will be.  
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xiv For an argument about the ways in which individuals drive a wider complex adaptive 
process of cultural change within states when they enjoy the liberty to act upon their beliefs 
and conceptions of the good see Tebble (2016).   
xv Indeed, providing development assistance may have a negative impact (Djankov, Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol, 2008; Young and Sheehan, 2014). 
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